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The Service Mark Alternative to the




In recent years, the development of the doctrine of the right of pub-
licity' has gained significant- attention from both courts and commenta-
tors.2 In essence, the doctrine protects the right of an individual,
especially a public celebrity, to reap the benefits of the commercial use
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1. The first case articulating the phrase "the right of publicity" and correctly identifying the
values the right protects was Halean Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); see also Nimmer, 2he Right of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONTEMPT. PROB. 203 (1954).
2. Seegenerally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Factors
Etc., v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1981); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods, Inc.,
508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc. v. Creative Card Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Felcher &
Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979);
Gordon, Right ofPrivacy in Name Likeness, Personality andHistory, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 553 (1960);
Note, The Right of Publicity--Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV.
527 (1976); Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scriops-Howard
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of his or her persona.3 Because the right of publicity evolved from the
common law right of privacy,4 the right of publicity has often been
confused by courts as protecting the privacy interest an individual has
in his or her right to be left alone, rather than the commercial interest
an individual has in the right to exploit his or her persona.5 The right
of publicity, which protects the commercial interest individuals (gener-
ally celebrities) have in their names and likenesses, is recognized today
as a right that is separate and distinct from the right of privacy. As a
result, certain general propositions circumscribing the right of publicity
have evolved, enabling courts to determine when a plaintiff will find
relief under a right of publicity claim.6 Nevertheless, just as most
courts agree with some of those general propositions, 7 some courts disa-
gree regarding other aspects of the right.
Not all jurisdictions recognizing the right of publicity allow the right
to survive the holder's death. Some courts require commercialization
or exploitation of the celebrity's persona in order for the right to sur-
vive,8 while other courts hold that regardless of exploitation the right is
Broadcasting Co., 30 SrAN. L. REv. 1185 (1978) J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRAC-
TICE, §215 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GILSON].
3. For the purpose of this article, the term "person" refers to a celebrated individual's name,
likeness, photograph, or image.
4. The right to privacy was initially defined in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
5. For examples of earlier cases where the courts confused the protection of commercial
interests with the protection of privacy interests see O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App.2d 650, 344 P.2d
799 (1959). The confusion between the commercial and the privacy interests has been com-
pounded by Dean Prosser's definition of the invasion of the right of privacy. See W. PROssER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser's fourth type of
invasion of privacy, "of the appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantages, of the plain-
tiff's name or likeness," id., caused some of the earlier courts confronted with the issue to conclude
that a celebrated plaintiff asserting a right of privacy claim had no cause of action because the
celebrity was only getting the publicity which he sought. See Mar/iole, 345 F.2d 418; see also
GILSON, supra note 2, §§2.15[4], [5].
Section 652(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts echoes Dean Prosser's definition of the
right of privacy and, likewise, adds to the confusion. It states that "[o]ne who appropriates to his
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for the
invasion of his privacy." RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652(c) (1977). While it is generally
accepted that an action for the invasion of the right of privacy may only be maintained by the
living individual whose privacy was invaded, section 652(1) comment a of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, is an exception to the general rule and indicates that in situations involving the
commercial appropriation of an individual's name and likeness, an action may survive that indi-
vidual's death. The Restatement's survivability proviso departs from Dean Prosser's view of the
survivability issue.
6. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
7. A majority of the courts addressing the right of publicity issue have characterized it as a
property right, thereby viewing the right as both alienable and descendible as are most other
property rights. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
8. See, eg., Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215; Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day
& Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485; Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Amen-
can Heritage Prods., 508 F. Supp. 854; Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426.
But see Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 51 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Ga. S. Ct. Oct. 28, 1982). After the question concerning the right of
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not survivable.9 in California, for example, where the need to protect a
celebrity's persona is particularly acute by virtue of the number of ce-
lebrities in the jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court nevertheless
held in Lugosi v. UniversalPictures'0 that the right of publicity does not
survive the holder's death in any circumstance.1 I Although Lugosi rep-
resents the minority view regarding a descendible right of publicity,
and in fact, an extreme position, that decision has a tremendous impact
on the large number of celebrities residing and working in California.
As a result of Lugosi and similar vagaries attending the right of pub-
licity, a plaintiff seeking to protect the commercial interest in his or her
persona may be required to resort to a more traditional, judicially ac-
ceptable cause of action such as a service mark infringement claim.
The service mark infringement claim is a viable alternative to a right of
publicity claim because both generally afford the aggrieved plaintiff the
same relief-an injunction which will halt the defendant's misappropri-
ation of a person's name, symbol, likeness, image or words.'" In addi-
tion, it is generally easier to enjoin conduct infringing on a service
mark rather than conduct infringing on the right of publicity because
an identifiable economic loss is not required in the former,' 3 whereas it
is required in the latter."
Recently, in Estate of Presley v. Russen, 5 District Court Judge Stan-
ley S. Brotman of the Northern District of New Jersey exhaustively
explored the plaintiff's alternatives to a right of publicity claim. In that
case the plaintiff, the estate of the late entertainer Elvis Presley, moved
for a preliminary injunction against the defendant, Russen, the pro-
ducer of a live stage show patterned after a Presley performance.' 6 In
publicity was certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to the Geor-
gia Supreme Court, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the right of publicity is inheritable and
devisable. The court found no compelling reason to require the right to be exploited in order for it
to survive the holder's death.
9. See Memphis Development Foundation, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
10. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (en banc).
11. Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
12. Compare Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (injunction issued to protect the name and config-
uration of a professional hockey team's service mark); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar's Palace, 490
F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1980) (injunction issued to protect the name and design of the service mark
"Caesar's Palace"); Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Dnve-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977)
(injunction issued to protect the name and design of the service mark "Fotomat") with, Pro Arts,
579 F.2d 215 (injunction issued under a right of publicity claim to halt the sale of Elvis Presley
posters); Groucho Marx Prods, 523 F. Supp. 485 (injunction issued to enjoin the presentation of a
Broadway show); Creative Card, 444 F. Supp. 279 (injunction issued to stop the sale of Elvis
Presley posters).
13. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
15. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
16. Id. at 1344. The preliminary injunction was sought pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The estate's ultimate goal was to permanently enjoin Russen's stage
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pertinent part, the estate alleged both a violation of its right of publicity
and a common law service mark infringement.'7 The infringement at
issue was the promotion and presentation of "The Big El Show," which
was billed as a "Tribute to Elvis Presley."' 8 The estate sought to pre-
liminarily enjoin both the actual stage presentation and the production
and sale of "Big El Show" albums, pendants, and buttons bearing the
likeness of Elvis Presley.' 9 The estate claimed that Russen's use of
Presley's name and likeness reduced the estate's ability to license the
Presley image and caused confusion in the eyes of the consuming pub-
lic as to the source of the entertainment services.2 °
The court evaluated the estate's claims under the standards for grant-
ing a preliminary injunction 21 and concluded that the estate had made
show as well as the attendant sale of record albums, pendants, buttons, etc. In addition, the estate
sought an impounding of the advertising materials which promoted Russen's show, an accounting
of Russen's profits, and an award of reasonable attorney fees. Id.
17. Id. The estate also alleged that Russen violated both section 43(a) of the Lanham Trade-
mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976) (federal trademark law) and the New Jersey common law of
unfair competition. Id. After granting an injunction on the common law service mark infringe-
ment claim, the Estate of Presley court was not compelled to exhaustively address the practicality
of either the section 43(a) claim or the unfair competition claim as alternatives to a right of public-
ity claim. Thus, both the section 43(a) claim and the unfair competition claim are beyond the
scope of this article and will not be addressed here.
To prove a bona fide common law service mark infringement, the estate needed to establish two
elements: first, that the estate had a valid service mark in Elvis Presley's persona which was
recognized by members of the consuming public, and second, that Russen's activity either was
likely to confuse members of the public as to the source of the entertainment services or caused the
estate to suffer an identifiable economic loss. See also infra notes 113-156 and accompanying text.
18. 513 F. Supp. at 1349. The court recognized three factors critical to the estate's common
law service mark infringement claim. First, Russen never entered into any licensing agreements
with the estate in connection with the advertising or promotion of either the stage show or other
related goods (i.e., record albums, pendants, buttons, etc.). Id. at 1350. This fact eliminated any
solace Russen may have enjoyed with a defensive claim of either laches or acquiescence. Second,
the court recognized that Russen's production was not merely a modest mimicry of an Elvis Pres-
ley production. Rather, it was a full scale imitation patterned after an actual Elvis Presley stage
show. Id. at 1348. Finally, the court concluded that 'Big El Show' promotional material and bona
fide Elvis Presley records and promotional material were confusingly similar. Id. at 1349-50.
These final two conclusions were essential elements to the estate's common law service mark in-
fringement claim-that a reasonable consumer was likely to be confused as to the source of the
entertainment services. See also infra notes 182-193 and accompanying text.
19. 513 F. Supp. at 1344.
20. Id. at 1362.
21. A preliminary injunction is an injunction issued to protect the status quo of the litigants.
See Burton v. Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc., 244 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 1957). It also protects the
plaintiff from irreparable injury and preserves the court's ability to render a meaningful decision
after a trial on the merits. In order to prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, generally
the plaintiffmnust establish four elements: that there is a significant threat of irreparable injury to
the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted; that the injury to the defendant if an injunction is
issued is less than the injury to the plaintiff if an injunction is not issued; that the plaintiff has a
probability of success on the merits; and that the public interest favors the granting of the injunc-
tion. See Lungrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980); Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp.,
589 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1978); National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 923
(1st Cir. 1979); see also 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, §2948 at
430-31 (1973). But see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1979) (preliminary injunction is appropriate where plaintiff establishes possible irrepara-
ble harm and either probable success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits to make them a fair ground for litigation or a balance of hardships tipping in the plaintiff's
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an adequate showing that it would succeed on the merits on all four
counts.22 The court concluded, however, that the estate failed in its
right of publicity claim to show that it would meet the second prelimi-
nary injunction requirement, a showing of irreparable injury.23 De-
spite the failure of the right of publicity claim, the court nevertheless
issued a preliminary injunction because the requisite irreparable injury
was established in the estate's remaining claims24 -infringement of the
estate's service marks and unfair competition.25
This article will examine the Estate of Presley court's decision to
grant relief on the Presley estate's service mark claim and explore how
plaintiffs seeking to protect the commercial interest in their names and
likenesses may do so with the more traditional service mark infringe-
ment cause of action. Part I will discuss the development of the right of
publicity and identify some of the infirmities attending the right of
publicity as it is currently recognized. Part II will discuss the common
law service mark infringement action as an alternative to a right of
publicity claim' and will outline the essential elements which must be
established in order for a court to conclude that a valid and protectable
service mark exists. Part III will discuss how the Estate of Presley court
employed the principles of service mark law to issue a preliminary in-
junction which halted Russen's misappropriation of the estate's service
marks.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity may be defined as an individual's right to have
"personal control over [the] commercial display and exploitation of his
[or her] personality and the exercise of his [or her] talents. ' 26 This right
has evolved over the last three decades to protect a celebrity's invest-
ment of the time, energy, and money expended to create a marketable
commodity-his or her persona. Although traditionally a celebrity's
reward for the creation of a persona was an increase in his or her ap-
favor). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' test for a preliminary injunction is slightly different.
In the Ninth Circuit the party requesting a preliminary injunction must first show that there is a
probability of success and a possibility of irreparable injury. Then that party must demonstrate
that serious questions are raised and that the balance of hardships are tipped sharply in its favor.
See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1979).
22. 513 F. Supp. at 1382.
23. Id. at 1378. Irreparable injury is generally equated with a showing of an identifiable
economic loss. See, e.g., Brown v. Choate, 411 U.S. 452 (1973); National Tank Truck Carriers,
Inc., 608 F.2d 819, 829; G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp.
352, 373 (D. Del. 1975).
24. 513 F. Supp. at 1380-81.
25. Id. at 1382. The Estate of Presley court found that the two remaining injunction require-
ments, a balance of the equities and a showing of a public interest, were met. Id. at 1381-82.
26. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977) (citations
omitted).
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peal to the public, the endorsement and licensing opportunities recently
available to popular celebrities has vastly increased the commercial
worth of the persona created. The right of publicity is designed to af-
ford celebrities the exclusive right to capitalize on that investment.27
A. The Origin and Development of the Right of Publicity
In some of the earlier cases addressing the unauthorized commercial
use of an individual's persona, the courts almost uniformly denied re-
covery because the right of publicity was often confused with the right
of privacy. In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. ,28 for instance, the plaintiff, a
famous football player, failed in his attempt to assert either a right to
prevent the use of his picture on a calendar advertising beer or a right
to recover for the advertising value of his photograph.29 In denying
relief, the court concluded that as a celebrity O'Brien had forfeited his
right of privacy, and thus, there was no actionable wrong.30 The court
further posited that O'Brien was only getting the publicity that he
sought. Judge Holmes, however, dissented, recognizing that although
O'Brien may have pleaded the wrong theory, invasion of privacy, an
athlete has a pecuniary interest in his or her name and likeness. 32
Judge Holmes' dissent was vindicated in Halean Laboratories, Inc. v.
27. Recognizing the exponentially growing endorsement and licensing opportunities for
prominent individuals, Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court recently stated in her
Lugosi dissent:
Today it is commonplace for individuals to promote or advertise commercial services
or products or. . . even have their identities infused in the products. Individuals promi-
nent in athletics, business, entertainment and the arts, for example, are frequently in-
volved in such enterprises .... As a result, the sale of one's persona in connection with
the promotion of commercial products has unquestionably become big business ...
Such commercial use of an individual's identity is intended to increase the value or
sales of the product by fusing the celebrity's identity with the product and thereby si-
phoning some of the publicity value or good will in the celebrity's persona into the prod-
uct. This use is premised, in part, on public recognition and association with that
person's name or likeness, or an ability to create such recognition.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d at 834, 603 P.2d at 437-38, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36 (Bird,
C.J., dissenting (citations omitted).
28. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942).
29. Id. at 170.
30. Id. at 169.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 170-71 (Holmes, J., dissenting). It was this critical distinction which the O'Brien
majority and other courts were not prepared to recognize. Compare Maritote v. Desilu Prods.
Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965) (Al Capone's widow and son sued
for unjust enrichment based on defendant's use of Al Capone's name and likeness in the television
series, "The Untouchables," and failed because the court concluded that plaintiffs were attempting
to assert the privacy rights of a deceased person) and Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust
& Savings, 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974) (court rejected Johnny Carson's claim against a travel
agency for damages based on the unauthorized use of his name and picture on the ground that
Nebraska state law did not yet recognize the right of privacy, and no cases were found distinguish-
ing a protectable right of publicity) with Edison v. Edison Polyform, 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392
(1907) (plaintiff, the famous inventor Thomas Edison, successfully enjoined the activities of a
company which sold medicinal products under the same Edison--tfhe court identified the exclu-
sive commercial interest an individual has in his of her name and likeness).
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Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. ,3 the first case to articulate the phrase "the
right of publicity" and clearly identify the commercial interests the
right was designed to protect. The Halean court recognized the right of
an individual to protect the publicity value of his or her photograph.34
The plaintiff, a bubble gum manufacturer, had contracted with several
professional baseball players for the exclusive right to use the ball-
players' photograph in connection with the sale of its product.35  Subse-
quently, the plaintiff sued the defendant for inducing the players to
breach their contracts with the plaintiff and enter into similar contracts
with the defendant. 6 The defendant argued that the plaintiff had no
legal interest in the publication of the players' photographs beyond the
player's right to privacy, a right courts traditionally had deemed as per-
sonal to the individual.37 The court rejected the defendant's claim and
concluded that the athletes had assigned a right of publicity that was
separate and distinct from the right of privacy.38 The court also rea-
soned that this right is concerned with the pecuniary interests involved
and affords judicial protection to individuals (generally prominent per-
sons) wishing to receive money for the exclusive endorsement of goods
and services. 39 Thus, the right of publicity bars other advertisers from
using an individual's name, likeness, photograph, or image.4 °
The pinnacle of judicial recognition of the right of publicity was
reached when the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Ohio
common law right of publicity in Zacehini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co.41 The plaintiff in that case, an entertainer, performed a
33. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
34. Id. at 868.
35. Id. at 867.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 868.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Several courts have reached similar conclusions and protected the right of celebrities to
grant exclusive licenses for their persona, although these courts did not necessarily employ the
phrase "the right of publicity." See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821 (9th Cir. 1974) (professional race car driver's right of publicity grants him an exclusive propri-
etary interest in his own identity); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) (profes-
sional baseball player has a valuable property right in his name, photograph, and image and may
grant to another the exclusive right to use his name and photo); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad-
casting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (prizefighter has "right of
action" against television station where television station broadcasted an old film clip of prizefight
without his consent); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (baseball play-
ers have proprietary interest in their names, sporting activities, and accomplishments which en-
ables players to enjoin manufacturer of baseball table games from using players' names without a
license); Palmer v. Schonhom Enters, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967) (professional
golfers could recover damages where defendant exploited and commercialized golfer's names,
reputations, and accomplishments in connection with defendant's golf table game); Hogan v. A.S.
Bames & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957) (professional golfer has enforceable property right
in his name and photograph).
41. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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"human cannonball" act in which he was shot from a cannon into a
net.42 Without Zacchini's consent, a local television station filmed his
entire fifteen second act and broadcasted the film clip on the evening
news.43  Zacchini sued for damages alleging that the news broadcast
violated his right of publicity.' The United States Supreme Court
agreed and upheld Zacchini's claim.45 The Zacchini Court identified
and protected two critical values: the proprietary interest an individual
has in his or her act46 and the prevention of unjust enrichment as a
result of the theft of goodwill by third parties.47 Drawing a parallel to
federal patent and copyright laws,48 the Court concluded that the right
of publicity protection provides the economic incentive for an individ-
ual to make the investment required to produce an act of interest to the
public.49 Moreover, the Court recognized that there was no justification
for allowing the defendant to get free of charge that for which he or she
would normally have to pay.
50
The Zacchini decision is important not only because it is the first
Supreme Court decision recognizing the right of publicity but also be-
cause it advances the fundamental property interests that are deeply
rooted in our economic and judicial system. Providing economic in-
centives for creative individuals and protecting their interests from un-
just interference on the part of third parties is an essential element in
the development of commercial, artistic, athletic and entertainment en-
deavors, and as Zacchini illustrates, those interests are not solely con-
fined to the area of patent and copyright law.
B Survivability of the Right of Publicity
Whether the right of publicity survives a person's death is important
because in jurisdictions which have some type of limitation on the
survivability of the right of publicity, it may be necessary for the plain-
tiff to resort to an alternative to that right when unable to satisfy the
42. Id. at 563.
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 578.
46. Id. at 575.
47. Id. at 576.
48. Consideration of the federal copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. §301 (1976), is important for
identifying the values that are protected by the statutory scheme and for developing a workable
time frame within which the right of publicity would survive after the celebrity's death. Although
they are analogous, the right of publicity and copyright protection are not equivalent; a copyright
protects a creator from the taking of specific expressions or arrangements, whereas the right of
publicity protects against unauthorized appropriation of an individual's persona which would re-
sult in unearned commercial gain to another. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278,
287 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
49. 433 U.S. at 576.
50. Id.
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limitation.5 1 The modem trend has been to recognize that the right of
publicity is like any other property right. As such, it is fully alienable
and survivable. 2 In Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. , for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an in-
junction against the unauthorized sale of a memorial poster bearing the
likeness of Elvis Presley and concluded that Elvis Presley's right of
publicity survived his death. 4 The court recognized that during his
lifetime Presley had licensed his right of publicity to a corporation
which in turn licensed its rights to the plaintiff following Presley's
death. The theoretical foundation upon which the court held that the
right was assignable and not extinguished by Presley's death was the
purely commercial nature of the protected right.56 Since the court rec-
ognized that the exclusive right to profit from a celebrity's name and
likeness was a transferable interest in property, the court held that this
factor "compel[led] the conclusion that the right survive[d] the celeb-
rity's death. 7 The court distinguished claims based on the right of pri-
vacy which do not survive because they are enforced solely to prevent
injury to feelings. 8
Some courts have held that regardless of exploitation, the right of
publicity does not survive the holder's death. 59 Thus, in Memphis De-
velopment Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc. ,60 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that under Tennessee law, Elvis
Presley's right of publicity did not survive his death.6' In its opinion
the court asserted that the right of publicity is similar to other "per-
sonal attributes" which are not inheritable such as titles and offices,
51. For an exhaustive exploration of the survivability problems associated with the right of
publicity, see Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publiity: Is There Commercial
Lffe After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Sims, Right of Publicity- Survivability Reconsidered,
49 FOPDHAM L.REv. 453 (1981). Comment, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of
Publicly, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 751 (1978).
52. See supra note 51.
53. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
54. Id. at 222.
55. Id. at 221-22.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 221.
58. Id. at 222. See also supra note 51. The survivability of the right of publicity finds addi-
tional support in the longstanding judicial policies of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of
another's goodwill and encouraging the investment of effort and creativity. See Zacchini, 433 U.S.
at 576. The Pro Arts court recognized that to hold that Presley's death extinguished the right that
was purchased by the plaintiff would grant a windfall to- competitors and render the exclusive
right virtually worthless. 579 F.2d at 221.
59. Some courts have avoided taking this drastic position because of the circumstances of the
respective cases. See, e.g., Pro Arts, 579 F.2d at 222 n.l l (because right was exploited during
celebrity's lifetime, court had no need to decide whether the right would survive celebrity's death
absent such exploitation); Martin Luther King, 508 F. Supp. at 864 (because right was not ex-
ploited during celebrity's lifetime, the court not need decide whether right was devisable).
60. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
61. Id. at 962.
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friendship, trust, and employment contracts. 2  Although the court
identified the policy underlying the right of publicity as "the encour-
agement of effort and creativity",6" the court failed to address the com-
mercial and assignable nature of that right. 4
A similar result was reached in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.65  In
Lugosi the California Supreme Court evaluated a right of publicity
claim advanced by the heirs of the late actor Bela Lugosi against Uni-
versal Pictures.6 6 The heirs claimed that Lugosi created a right of pub-
licity in the Count Dracula character, which he portrayed in a series of
Universal Films. The court viewed the heirs' claim essentially as an
invasion of the right of privacy claim and held that "the right to exploit
[one's] name and likeness is personal to the artist and must be exer-
cised, if at all, by him during his lifetime. 67
The court was persuaded by Dean Prosser's definition of the right of
62. Id. at 959. This analogy was incorrect because unlike these personal attributes, cele-
brated names and faces have a publicity value that is regularly exploited to sell commercial prod-
ucts through mass-marketing techniques. While trust per se cannot be sold, the right to use a
name or likeness that inspires trust in a product or service, like the right to use a service mark
which has goodwill, can be.
63. Id. at 958.
64. Id. at 957. The Memphis Development decision failed to recognize that in our commercial
society, the ability to pass on the fruits of one's work to one's heirs spurs America's producers to
create new wealth. See Factors, Etc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield,
J., dissenting) ("To maintain, as Memphis Development did, that 'leaving a good name to one's
children is sufficient reward in itself for the indivdual,' ... constitutes a rather heavy burden to
impose on creativity," (citation omitted)).
The continuing viability of Memphis Development has been seriously questioned. In 1981, in an
unpublished opinion, a Tennessee chancery court held that under Tennessee law there exists a
survivable right of publicity. See Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of Cumberland, Inc., 551 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRiGHT J. (BNA) A-3 (Oct. 2, 1981). In 1982, however, another Tennessee
chancery court held that the right to publicity is not survivable under Tennessee law. See Lancas-
ter v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. 88 927-2 (Shelby Co. Ch. Ct. Nov. 24, 1982). Prior to Commerce
Union and Lancaster the Second Circuit had deferred to the Sixth's Circuit's Memphis Develop-
ment decision in a case concerning the right of publicity in Tennessee. See Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982) (Factors II). After
Commerce Union and Lancaster, however, the plaintiffs in Factors ! petitioned the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for a rehearing alleging that there is evidence that Ten-
nessee recognizes a survivable right of publicity. At the time this article was published, the Sec-
ond Circuit had not yet decided this petition.
65. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 602 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
66. Id. at 816-17, 603 P.2d at 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
67. Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (emphasis added). Throughout the
opinion the court took judicial notice of the fact that, during his lifetime, Lugosi had never ex-
ploited his name or likeness in connection with any business, product, or service. See id. at 818-
20, 603 P.2d at 428-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27. The court postulated that Lugosi could have
exploited his right of publicity if he had sold "commercial tie-ups," id. at 818 n.5, 603 P.2d at 428
n.5, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 n.5, such as endorsements or licenses to his name, face, or likeness.
The court's extensive discussion about exploitation leads one to conclude that the court would
have been compelled to find a survivable right of publicity if Lugosi had exploited his right of
publicity during his lifetime. This conclusion is erroneous. The exploitation discussion was predi-
cated at the outset of the opinion on an understanding of California unfair competition laws.
Stated simply, the Lugosi court said that the right of publicity will not survive in any circum-
stance; however, in the event that the individual's name has achieved a "secondary meaning" in
the public's eyes, see infra notes 144-152, then the individual's estate or heirs may raise an unfair
competition claim. Since service mark law is a part of the broader law of unfair competition, the
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privacy, and concluded that death terminated Lugosi's right of public-
ity and released his name into the public domain. 68 The court justified
a rule of nondescendibility because, in its view, the right was personal
and because courts would have difficulty in selecting an appropriate
durational limit within which the right would survive.69
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
applied the Lugosi decision in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day
and Night Company, Inc. 7 0 and held that the Marx Brothers' rights of
publicity did not survive their death.7 In Groucho Marx Productions
the heirs and assignees of the Marx Brothers' rights of publicity as-
serted that the right protected against the production of the Broadway
play, "A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine."72 Concluding
that New York law governed, the district court held that the heirs and
assignees had asserted a valid right of publicity claim.73 The Second
Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in its conclusion
that New York law applied.74 The court of appeals reasoned that,
under the circumstances, California law should have been applied.
75
Thus, the court of appeals looked to Lugosi and its progeny for the
Lugosi unfair competition proviso is yet another reason why the Estate of Presley service mark
infringement action is a viable alternative for would-be California right of publicity litigants.
Two days after the Lugosi decision was released, the California Supreme Court summarily
affirmed the Lugosi rationale in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d
454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). In that case the plaintiff, the nephew of the late actor Rudolph
Valentino, claimed that the defendant's television program depicting Valentino's life violated Va-
lentino's right of publcity. As Valentino's legal heir, Guglielmi argued that he was the present
owner of the right and was entitled to damages and injunctive relief. The court denied recovery.
Stating that Lugosi controlled, the court held that "the right of [of publicity] is not descendible
and expires on the death of the person so protected." Id. at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
353.
68. 25 Cal. 3d at 820, 603 P.2d at 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327. As explained supra at note 5,
Dean Prosser's position that the commercial misappropriation of one's name and likeness consti-
tutes an invasion of the right of privacy is a position shared by few.
69. 25 Cal. 3d at 823 n.8, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. 329. If one accepts that the right of
publicity, despite its genesis, is a right which protects against unfair competition, then the concerns
expressed by the Lugosi court are about the duration of the right are easily answered--the right of
publicity, just as a service mark or a trademark right, exists only as long as the mark is used and
not abandoned. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (the
right of a trademark is not a right in gross; it exists only as a right appurtenant to an established
business for the protection of the business' goodwill).
70. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
71. Id. at 318.
72. Id. at 318-19.
73. 523 F. Supp. 485, 487 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The district court reasoned that New York
law governed since the injury occurred in New York, the defendants were New York residents, the
play ran in New York longer than anywhere else, and the Marx Brothers' characters were origi-
nally developed and perfected in New York. Id.
74. 689 F.2d at 319.
75. Id. at 319-20. The circuit court rejected the reasons which the district court cited in
concluding that New York law governed. See supra note 73. Instead, the Second Circuit was
persuaded by, among other things, the facts that all three of the Marx brothers were California
residents at the time of their death, the plaintiff, Groucho Marx Productions, is a California corpo-
ration and plaintiff Susan Marx is a California resident, and Groucho Marx, while in California,
assigned his right of publicity to Groucho Marx Productions. Id. at 320.
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operative law governing the descendibility issue.76
The Second Circuit exhaustively analyzed the rationale and holding
in Lugosi. Recognizing that there is some confusion regarding the lan-
guage employed by the Lugosi court, the Second Circuit noted that the
"secondary meaning" discussion in Lugosi "is the language of trade-
mark [and service mark] law."7 7 The Second Circuit posited that this
language may have been designed to relegate a celebrity's heirs and
assignees solely to their rights under trademark (and service mark)
law.78 It is critical to note that instead of foreclosing all avenues of
relief for the heirs and assignees of a celebrity by recognizing "that
California does not recognize any descendible right of publicity," 79 the
Second Circuit concluded that "the heirs [or assignees] of a celebrity
[may] rely on trademark [or service mark] law"80 to protect the com-
mercial interest in the celebrity's name and likeness."'
The Groucho Marx Productions court is the first court to suggest that
as a means to circumvent Lugosi, an heir or an assignee may find relief
under a trademark or service mark infringement claim. The Groucho
Marx Productions decision is persuasive authority for the proposition
that a would-be right of publicity litigant should assert, in addition to
or instead of, a right of publicity claim, a common law trademark or
service mark infringement claim.
C. Right of Publicity Conclusion
Although the right of publicity has received widespread judicial rec-
ognition, going as high as the United States Supreme Court,82 the right
of publicity vagaries that exist in some jurisdictions necessitate that
plaintiffs seeking to protect the commercial interest in their persona
plead an additional, alternative cause of action. As Section II will illus-
76. Id. at 319-23.
77. Id. at 9 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 820 (1961)). For a distinction between service marks and trademarks see infra notes 89-
90 and accompanying text.
78. 689 F.2d at 322.
79. Id. at 323.
80. Id.
81. The court suggested that in addition to the trademark interpretation, Lugosi may be sub-
ject to a second interpretation. Under this alternative interpretation, Lugosi may mean that Cali-
fornia recognizes a descendible right of publicity, but it is limited solely to the use of the
celebrity's name and likeness in connection with any product or service that the celebrity pro-
moted by exploiting his right of publicity during his lifetime. Id. By definition, the second inter-
pretation is more restrictive than the trademark interpretation. In the "exploitation"
interpretation, the use of the celebrity's name and likeness may be applied only to those products
and services that the celebrity authorized during his lifetime, while in the trademark interpreta-
tion, service marks and trademarks may be used in connections with goods and services that are
developed and endorsed after the celebrity's death.
82. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
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trate, a viable alternative cause of action which may grant the re-
quested relief is the service mark infringement claim.
II. COMMON LAW SERVICE MARK INFRINGEMENT ALTERNATIVE
When a plaintiff has failed to establish a valid right of publicity
claim, either because those elements necessary for a preliminary in-
junction to issue have not been established83 or because the jurisdiction
places some limitation on the right of publicity, it becomes necessary
for the plaintiff to resort to another cause of action which will protect
his or her pecuniary interest in his or her name and likeness. One such
alternative cause of action to the right of publicity claim is a common
law service mark infringement claim.
Service marks are protected under both federal and state laws.84 The
Lanham Trademark Act of 194685 provides protection under the fed-
eral system while the California Trademark Law affords protection for
trademarks, service marks, and trade names under the laws of Califor-
nia.8 6 Although both the federal and the California systems of trade-
mark protection permit the owner of a valid service mark to register a
mark,87 in the event that the owner fails to register the mark, he or she
is nevertheless given full protection over the mark.88 Frequently, the
owner of a service mark will have a cause of action under both the state
law and the Lanham Act.
In the common law a service mark is defined as any name, word,
symbol, device, or any combination thereof used in connection with the
sale or advertising of the services of one person to distinguish them
83. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
84. A leading commentator on trademarks and service marks has noted that most states pro-
vide for registration of trademarks and service marks used in that state. See J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§22:1, 22:5 (1973) (hereinafter cited as MCCARTHY,;
see also Stroup, A Practical Guide to the Protection of Artists Through Copyright, Trade Secret,
Patent, and Trademark Law, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 189, 217-24 (1981).
85. 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1976).
86. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§14200-14325.
87. See 15 U.S.C. §1053 (1976) (federal registration of service marks); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§14220-14233 (registration of service marks in California).
88. Under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (1976), a service mark does
not have to be registered to be afforded protection. Under section 14203 of the California Busi-
ness and Professional Code, a "mark" as used in the Trademark Act "includes any trademark or
service mark entitled to registration pursuant to . . . (the Trademark Act) whether registered or
not." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §14203 (emphasis added). Although not required, it is strongly
suggested that the owner of any valid and legally protectable service mark endeavor to register
that mark under the state trademark statute, the Lanham Act, or both. Registration of a mark has
several legal and strategic advantages. Under the state law registration serves asprimafacie proof
of ownership; places others on constructive notice of a claim of ownership so as to eliminate any
defense of good faith in adopting an infringing mark; and serves as a powerful bargaining chip in
settlement negotiations. When a service mark owner registers that mark under the Lanham Act,
in addition to the advantages outlined above, the owner is entitled to bring his or her case in
federal court and be able to recover profits, damages, costs, and treble damages. See MCCARTHY,
supra note 84, §§19:5, 22:1; GILSON, supra note 2, §§4.01-4.04, 4.06.
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from the services of others.8 9 Historically, service marks were designed
to indicate the origin of services.90 They are intended both to assist
customers in the identification of the services they sought 9' and to pre-
vent competitors from "palming off" their services.
92
A successful common law service mark infringement action extends
protection to the owner of the mark one step beyond that protection
afforded in a right of publicity claim. In the former, the plaintiff asserts
that he or she owns a valid and protectable service mark and that the
defendant's subsequent use of the same or similar mark to identify its
services either infringed on the plaintiff's service mark or is likely to
cause confusion as to the origin of the goods or services.93 Because
service mark laws exist not to protect the service markper se, but rather
to achieve the twin goals of protecting the right of the consuming pub-
lic to be free from confusion and the right of the owner to control his or
her service's reputation,94 a plaintiff asserting a service mark infringe-
ment need not show an identifiable economic loss. Instead, he or she
only needs to show a likelihood of confusion as to the source.95
89. Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar's Palace, 490 F. Supp. 818, 823-24 (D.N.J. 1980). Fre-
quently, the terms service mark and trademark are used interchangeably. Although the general
principles governing service mark infringement are also applicable in a trademark infringement,
see Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1009 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp.
693, 702-03 (D.N.J. 1977), it is important to note that a service mark identifies a service while a
trademark identifies a good. See generally Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. 818; GILSON, supra note 2,
§ 3.02[1]. Under the California Trademark Law a service mark is defined as "a mark used in the
sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the
services of others." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §14206.
90. See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878) (an infringement would be found upon a
showing by plaintiff that members of the public exercising ordinary caution are likely to be misled
into buying an article believing that the article is manufactured by plaintiff); see also Victor Tool
& Machine Corp. v. Sun Control Awnings, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Mich. 1968), affid, 411
F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1969) (after 15 uninterrupted years of employing the mark "Sun Control," the
public recognized and distinguished defendant's goods and services as eminating from a particular
source); Stork Restaurant Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (where plaintiff operated
a restaurant named "The Stork Club" and defendant subsequently operated and promoted a res-
taurant under the same name, a violation of trademarks and service marks would be found be-
cause of the resulting confusion to the public).
91. Howard Dustless Duster Co. v. Carleton, 219 F. 913 (D. Conn. 1915) (defendant's pack-
aging and selling of dustcloths would be enjoined where packaging deceived the public into be-
lieving product was that of plaintiffs).
92. Generally, the phrase "palming off' means the practice by a commercial competitor of
deceiving the public into purchasing its (the competitor's) services under the mistaken belief that
they are offered by another (usually the plaintiff). Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
93. See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229-30, (3d Cir. 1978);
Caesarr World, 490 F. Supp. 818, 823-24; Fotomat, 425 F. Supp. 693, 702-03; Time Mechanisms,
Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 915 (D.N.J. 1976).
94. James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds on retrial, 572 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1978).
95. See James Burrough, 540 F.2d at 275-76 (plaintiff, a distiller, was not required to show
that defendant's (a restaurant owner) infringing mark caused plaintiff to suffer an economic loss;
instead, plaintiff only needed to show that a viewer of the infringing mark would be likely to
associate that mark with the plaintiffs goods or services); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleber-
ry Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (because of a trademark's unique fune-
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On the other hand, in the right of publicity context, because the right
is designed to protect the commercial value of the celebrity's name and
likeness, 96 the plaintiff must not only show that he or she owns the right
and that he or she is likely to succeed on the merits but must also show
with sufficient certainty that the defendant's infringement caused or is
likely to cause an identifiable economic loss.97 Often, this is an onerous
burden for the plaintiff to meet, and as a result, the plaintiff's right of
publicity claim may fail.98
Individuals, particularly entertainers and professional athletes, may
acquire service mark or trademark protection for their names,99 nick-
names, 100 photographs, likenesses, or images.10 1 A valid service mark
protects the holder of the mark against another's use of the mark in
connection with the offering of similar services. For example, if an en-
tertainer advertises and promotes his or her show under his or her
name and the consuming public recognizes that the production is one
performed by that entertainer, another's subsequent, unauthorized use
of that entertainer's name in connection with the promotion and pres-
entation of a second show is a violation of the entertainer's service
marks. In addition to offering entertainment services, that same enter-
tainer may license his or her name and photograph to a manufacturer
tion in representing intangible assets such as reputation and goodwill, plaintiff only needed to
show a high probability of confusion in order to satisfy the irreparable injury requirement of a
preliminary injunction); Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Eisner Co., 482 F. Supp. 980, 990 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (if a likelihood of confusion is established in a trademark infringement case, irreparableinjury is presumed, notwithstanding a showing of monetary loss); Louis Rich, Inc. v. Horace W.
Longacre, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1327, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (to prevail on a trademark infringement
claim, plaintiff only needed to show that defendant's infringing mark was likely to cause confusion
with plaintiffs marks). See also McCARTHY, supra note 84, §30:18; GIIsON, supra note 2, §5.01.
96. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 23.
98. Of course, if this is always the case, the obvious question becomes, "Why does a plaintiff
assert a right of publicity claim when he or she could find relief under the alternative service mark
infringement claim?" It is the authors' position that because of the novelty of the service mark
infringement action and because of the twin obstacles of proving a valid service mark and show-
ing a likelihood of confusion, a plaintiff may feel more secure resorting to a right of publicity
claim. After Estate of Presley, however, it is more likely that a plaintiff will be more receptive to
the service mark infringement alternative.
99. In order for one's name to become a service mark under the comnion law, the individual
must show that his or her name has achieved what is referred to as a "secondary meaning." That
is, a substantial number of the consuming public associates the entertainer's personal name as a
symbol which identifies and distinguishes his or her services from those offered by others. The
secondary meaning requirement is more fully discussed infra at notes 132-40 and accompanying
text. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 84, §13:2; GIISON, supra note 2, §2.08.
100. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979) (former
football player's nickname "Crazylegs" was protectable under a trade name infringement action).
101. See, ag., In re Carson, 197 U.S.P.Q. 554, 555 (r.T.A.B. 1977) (the name "Johnnie Car-
son" is a valid service mark which identifies a comedian of that name); Five Platters, Inc. v.
Purdie, 419 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1976) (the name "The Platters" is a valid service mark which
identifies a singing group); In re Folk, 160 U.S.P.Q. 213 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (the fictitious name "The
Lollipop Princess" is a valid service mark which identifies a storyteller); In re Ames, 160 U.S.P.Q.
214 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (the name "Neal Ford & The Fanatics" is a valid service mark which identi-
fies a group of performers).
Pacqic Law Journal / Vol. 14
for the production of tee-shirts bearing his or her name and likeness. A
subsequent, unauthorized manufacturer's production of the same or
similar tee-shirts would be a violation of the entertainer's common law
trademark rights." 2
A successful service mark infringement action is predicated on a
showing that the plaintiff owned the mark, that the defendant's in-
fringement was likely to confuse or deceive the consuming public, and
that the names or symbols are valid, legally protectable service
marks. 
10 3
A. Ownership of Service Marks
The first requirement that the plaintiff asserting a service mark in-
fringement claim must meet is that he or she is the legal owner of the
service mark.' 4 In the common law, since service mark protection
arises from use, the general rule is that if the plaintiff can establish that
he or she was the first user in commerce of that particular service mark
then he or she has made a strong showing of ownership.10 5 In addition,
102. In Estate of Presley the estate claimed that Russen's activity infringed on the estate's
common law service mark rights and the estate's common law trademark rights. 513 F. Supp. at
1362. The court chose, however, to concentrate its attention on the estate's service mark infringe-
ment claim. Before focusing on the service mark claim, the court noted that the same marks that
were asserted as service marks might also be trademarks which identified goods or particular
products licensed by either the estate or Presley himself. Id. at 1363.
The recognition by the Estate ofPresley court that a service mark may also serve as a trademark
affords additional protection to the would-be service mark litigant. Many celebrities license their
name and photograph in connection with matters tangentially related to their primary (entertain-
ment or athletic) service. For example, the right of publicity infringement in the Elvis Presley line
of cases typically concerned the production and marketing of Elvis Presley memorabilia such as
posters and statuettes). See, e.g., Pro Arts, 579 F.2d 215 (Presley posters); Creative Card, 444 F.
Supp. 279 (Presley posters); Memphis Development Foundation, 441 F. Supp. 1323 (Presley statu-
ettes). Recognizing that celebrities have common law service mark and common law trademark
rights in their names and likenesses permits these celebrities or their heirs to assert either a service
mark infringement claim or a trademark infringement claim. The service mark infringement
claim halts the promotion and advertising of an actual performance which imitates the celebrity,
whereas a trademark infringement claim stops the production and sale of memorabilia (posters,
buttons, key chains, etc.) which infringes on the holder's trademark. See, e.g., Wyatt Earp Enters,
Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (plaintiff, the producer of the television
series "The Life and Legend of Wyatt Earp", successfully enjoined a children's clothing manufac-
turer from merchandising children's playsuits under the name, mark, and symbol "Wyatt Earp").
One commentator has suggested that a trademark owner's "Right of Identity", that is, the owner's
right to protect his or her trademark's "persona", is analogous to an entertainer's right of public-
ity. See Winner, Right of dentity: Right of Publicity and Protectionfor a Trademark's "Persona",
71 TRADE-MARK REP. 197 (1981).
103. See Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d 1225; Perfectform Corp. v. Perfect Brassiere Co., 256 F.2d
736 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 919 (1958); Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. 818; Fotomat, 425 F.
Supp. 693; Oonaar, 422 F. Supp. 905.
104. If the plaintiff asserting a service mark infringement claim can show that his or her mark
was registered under either the Lanham Act or the applicable state statute, this fact establishes a
rebuttable presumption that the mark is both valid and owned by the plaintiff. See supra note 88.
105. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918); Hanover Star Mill-.
ing Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916). Ownership is often an essential requirement to prove
standing. As the Supreme Court stated in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the test to deter-
mine standing is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
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however, the plaintiff must allege that the service mark is still being
used in commerce to identify the plaintiffs services. 106 The rationale
here is that a service mark has no existence independent of the service
in connection with which the mark is used.10 7 If the plaintiff shows that
there has been no severance between the existence of the service mark
and its actual use, then the plaintiff still maintains title in the mark. 10 8
Although service marks are considered intellectual property, they,
nevertheless, are accorded traditional property right protection'0 9 and
are fully alienable and descendible." 0 Thus, unlike the situation in a
right of publicity context, descendibility of the service mark never be-
comes an issue. Title to the service mark simply passes to the adminis-
trator or executor of the estate' who is entrusted with the duty of
preserving and managing the assets of the estate." 2 A valid service
mark classification, in addition to or instead of a right of publicity clas-
sification, therefore, grants the owner of the service mark a distinct le-
gal advantage. In the former, title to a valid service mark will pass to
the estate regardless of whether the jurisdiction prohibits a descendible
right of publicity.
B. Likelihood of Confusion
The most critical requirement which the plaintiff asserting a common
law service mark infringement claim must establish is a likelihood of
controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the
court's remedial powers of his behalf." Id. at 498-99 (citations omitted). Proof of the ownership
of the service mark at issue in the infringement claim aids in satisfying the "personal stake"
requirement.
106. See, e.g., La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Gallon v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265,
1271-72 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant constructively surrendered exclusive right to a trademark when
evidence showed that defendant's federal trademark registration expired and that defendant made
only 89 sales of trademarked perfume in a 20 year period).
107. United Drug, 248 U.S. at 97.
108. The proponent of the mark must also show that the use of the mark has been deliberate
and continuous and not sporadic, casual, or transitory. See Jean Patou, 495 F.2d at 1272; see also
R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR CoMPETIToN, TRADEMARKs & MONOPOLIES, §76.2(d) (3rd ed. 1969).
109. See Hanover Star Ailling, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (trademark owner's common law right of
exclusive use of the trademark may be classified as a property right; however, the right grows out
of use and not mere adoption); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 84, §2:6.
Section 654 of the California Civil Code defines property. It states that "the ownership of a
thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this
Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property." CAL. CIV. CODE §654.
Section 655 of the California Civil Code goes further and indicates that trademarks are "property"
within the meaning of section 654. See CAL. Crw. CODE §§654-655.
110. Mr. Justice Holmes recognized that "in a qualified sense the [trade]-mark is property,
protected and alienable." Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927).
Ill. See Dilworth v. Hake, 64 S.W.2d 829 (trade name passed from decedent to the executrix
of the estate as part of the assets of the estate) (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Cf. Ward-Chandler Bldg.
Co. v. Caldwell, 8 Cal. App. 2d 375, 377, 47 P.2d 758, 759-60 (1935) (trademark may be preserved
and assigned where the mark is deprived of all personal aspects and used in connection with the
operation of a business).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs §174 (1957).
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confusion as to the source of the services." 3 Likelihood of confusion
exists when members of the consuming public viewing the service mark
-may assume that the service it represents is associated with the source
of a different service identified by a similar mark.I 4 The question then
is not whether the services per se would be confused, but whether pro-
spective purchasers of the services are likely to believe that the services
originate or are performed by the same .party. l5
To answer this question, courts have developed workable formulas
which account for the essential factors necessary to the determina-
tion." 6 These formulas evaluate the strength of the plaintiffs marks,
the similarity between the plaintiffs and the defendant's marks, the evi-
dence of actual confusion by members of the consuming public, the
intent of the defendant in adopting the mark, and whether the services
are marketed through the same channels of trade.' 7
As discussed in the above section regarding the protectability of the
plaintiff's marks, the strength or weakness of the plaintiffs marks is an
important consideration in a showing of likelihood of confusion.
113. See generally Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
204-05 (2d Cir. 1979); Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d at 1231; Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at 823-24.
114. Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d at 1229.
115. See E. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE, §5.2 at 139-40 (2d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as VANDENBURGH].
116. A court will balance these factors through the eyes of "ordinary purchasers, buying with
ordinary caution." McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1878). Of course, by definition, when
employing the "ordinary purchaser" as the guide to determine a likelihood of confusion, the court
is required to speculate regarding the impressions each of these factors has on the ordinary pur-
chaser. Because of this speculation as well as the case by case approach used by the courts, it often
becomes difficult to see any consistency within the case law. Compare Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's
Liquid Gold, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Del. 1977), rev'd, 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978) (Scott 1),
with Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978) (Scott I1). Never-
theless, it is this very burden of speculation thrust on the court that affords it the opportunity to
balance the equities of the competing claims and draw reasonable conclusions based on a totality
of the circumstances.
117. Additional factors considered by the courts include the price of the goods, the length of
time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising, the extent to
which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same, and the relationship of the goods in the
mind of the public because of the similarity of function. See, e.g., Scott 1I, 589 F.2d at 1229;
Scarves by Vera, Inc., v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1976); Union Carbide
Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976);
Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at 823-24; Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d
794, 800 (9th Cir. 1970); Scott 1, 439 F.Supp. at 1036-37; Fotoaat 425 F.Supp. at 703; McNeil
Laboratories, Inc. v. American Home Prods Corp., 416 F. Supp. 804, 806 (D.N.J. 1976).
In Bell v. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1971), a trade
name infringement action initiated by the American College of Trial Lawyers against the Ameri-
can Trial Lawyers Association, the California Court of Appeal formulated a nonexhaustive check-
list to determine whether a likelihood of confusion existed under the common law. The checklist
included an inquiry into whether actual confusion in the mind of the average prudent man had
occurred, a side-by-side comparison of the names in question, and an inquiry into whether the
defendant knew about the plaintifl's mark before the defendant used its mark. Id. at 309-10, 92
Cal. Rptr. at 241-42. The court posited that, in any event, the critical factor in a likelihood of
confusion determination was the impression the mark as a whole created, by sight, sound, or
meaning, on the average, reasonably prudent member of the relevant public. Id. at 307, 92 Cal.
Rptr. at 240.
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Strength refers to the ability of a service mark to identify, in the eyes of
the consuming public, goods as emanating from a particular, although
possibly anonymous, source.1 8  In a likelihood of confusion assess-
ment, time, goodwill and the amount of energy and capital expended in
the course of marketing a service all contribute to the development of a
strong service mark. Generally, strong service marks are given a wide
range of protection over related services while weaker marks are given
a narrower range of protection. 1 9
The similarity between the service marks at issue is another relevant
factor. The greater the similarity between the plaintiffs and defend-
ant's marks, the greater the likelihood of confusion. 120 An evaluation
of the similarity of the marks in question requires a determination
based on a totality of the individual features, 121 including a comparison
with respect to similarity of appearance, pronounciation, and meaning.
One commentator has suggested that the similarity of service marks
evaluation involves nothing more than an "eyeball" test on the part of
the finder of fact. 122 The test, by definition, requires the finder of fact to
view the conflicting marks and evaluate the likelihood of confusion
based on the overall impression which the marks create.
23
Although a showing of actual confusion by members of the ordinary
public is not required,1 24 it is strongly recommended that a complain-
ant always endeavor to discover and assert the best possible evidence of
actual confusion in any controversy.1 25 The plaintiff may show actual
confusion by resorting to such means as interviews or surveys. Some-
times an inartfully drafted answer to a complaint may serve as an ad-
mission by the defendant that his or her mark actually confused
members of the consuming public. This occurred in Ball v. American
TrialLawyersAssociation. 26 In that case, the defendant acknowledged
118. See McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979). The
McGregor-Doniger court identified and arranged in ascending order of strength four categories of
marks-generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary and fanciful. Id. The relative strength or
weakness of a descriptive personal name service mark, such as an entertainer's name, depends on
the amount of secondary meaning the name has acquired in the public's mind.
119. See Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Assoc., Inc. 332 F.2d 534, 540 (3d Cir. 1964)
(distinctive or unique marks are given a wider range of protection against infringement than less
distinct marks because distinctive marks create a deeper, longer-lasting impression on the public's
consciousness).
120. See Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir.
1980) (after considering the overall impression created by the marks Tex-On and EXXON, the
court concluded that the marks were not sufficiently similar in design to find a likelihood of
confusion).
121. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS §729 comment b (1938).
122. MCCARTHY, supra note 84, §23:7.
123. Id.; see also supra note 117.
124. See Caesars World, 490 F.Supp. at 825.
125. See VANDENBURGH, supra note 115, at §5.52; GILSON, supra note 2, §5.01.
126. 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1971).
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that as a result of the great publicity sought and attained for its name, a
* member of the public may associate the defendant's name with the
plaintiffs services when that member later encounters the plaintiffs or-
ganization, "The American College of Trial Lawyers".
1 27
The determination of the defendant's intent in his or her adoption of
the infringing mark is often difficult. However, if the plaintiff can es-
tablish that the defendant adopted the mark in question with the inten-
tion of capitalizing on the plaintiffs goodwill, that fact alone may be
dispositive of the issue of confusing similarity.'12  Essentially, it
amounts to the defendant's admission that the respective service marks
are interchangeable. Without an absolute showing of the defendant's
intent, the court may nevertheless draw reasonable inferences regard-
ing the defendant's intent. 129 In Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar's Pal-
ace, 30 for example, the court drew reasonable inferences and found
that the defendant intended to adopt its infringing service mark
"Caesars Palace" when it was shown that the defendant had a prior
awareness of plaintiffs marks, and the defendant's own marks were
virtually identical in design and name.'
3 1
The similarity of service factor does not require the plaintiff to show
that members of the consuming public actually believe that the service
is performed by the plaintiff. Rather, the test is whether ordinary pur-
chasers generally familiar with the plaintiff's service marks are likely to
believe that the defendant's service mark is somehow related to the en-
tity that provides the plaintiffs services. 132 Thus, if members of the
consuming public are inclined to believe that the defendant's service is
licensed by the plaintiff, then this is sufficient to establish the similarity
of service factor. In Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas
Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. 133 for example, the court concluded that
since members of the consuming public were likely to believe that Dal-
las Cap & Emblem was licensed by the Boston Bruins Hockey team to
127. Id. at 309, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
128. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §729 comment f (1938). Although proof of fraudulent in-
tent is very helpful in a likelihood of confusion showing, the California courts have consistently
held that fraudulent intent is not required to prove either a trademark or a service mark infringe-
ment. See Stork Restaurant v. Shati, 166 F.2d 348, 360 (9th Cir. 1948); Dodge Stationery Co. v.
Dodge, 145 Cal. 380, 390, 78 P. 879, 883 (1904); Ball, 14 Cal.App.3d at 306, 92 Cal.Rptr. at 239-40;
MacSweeney Enters., Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 Cal.App.2d 549, 561, 45 Cal.Rptr. 546, 554 (1965).
129. California has adopted the familiar tort concept that every person is presumed to intend
the natural and foreseeable consequence of his actions. See Dodge Stationery Co., 145 Cal. at 390,
78 P. at 883. As a result, the California courts have wide latitude in drawing the reasonable
inferences necessary in determining the defendant's intent. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 84,
§23:33(D); GILSON, supra note 2, §5.03.
130. 490 F.Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1980).
131. Id. at 824-26.
132. See, eg., Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d at 504; Schmid Laboratories v. Young Drug Prods.
Corp., 482 F.Supp. 14, 19-20 (D.N.J. 1979).
133. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
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manufacture Boston Bruins emblems, the test for similarity of services
was met.
134
After an examination of ill of these relevant factors, the court will
ultimately look through "the eyes of ordinary purchasers buying with
ordinary caution' 35 to determine whether a likelihood of confusion
exists. Since a "likelihood of confusion" analysis is often a conjectural
process subject to the vagaries of consumer purchasing, the fictional
"ordinary purchaser" enables the court to analyze realistically the im-
pact the defendant's alleged infringing mark has on the plaintiffs serv-
ice mark and established goodwill.
C. Validity and Protectability of Service Marks
The final requirement that a plaintiff alleging a service mark in-
fringement must establish is that his or her service mark is valid and
protectable. A service mark is valid and protectable when it is adopted
and employed in connection with the rendering of services in order to
identify those services and distinguish them from the services of
others.' 36 The mark can be a word, name, 137 symbol, 131 or device; and
as long as the mark is used in connection with the services, ;it may
achieve protected status. 139 However, the service mark must not be the
service itself, but rather a designation of the source of those services.14°
A showing by the plaintiff that the mark was used in promoting, ad
134. Id. at 1012.
135. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1878).
136. See Caesars World, 490 F.Supp. at 822.
137. A name achieves service mark status not because it identifies an individual but because it
identifies a service provided by that individual or his or her affiliates. See.In re Carson, 197
U.S.P.Q. 554 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (the name "Johnnie Carson" is a valid service mark not because it
identifies the comedian John W. Carson but because it identifies the entertainment services which
Carson provides); see also Capetola v. Orlando, 426 F.Supp. 616 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Five Platters v.
Purdie, 419 F.Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1976). But see In re Lee Travino Enterprises, Inc., 182 U.S.P.Q.
253 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (the name "Lee Travino" was held merely to identify a famous professional
golfer of that name and not services that he may have rendered).
138. See Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d 1004; Fotomat, 425 F.Supp. 693; In re Pierce, 164 U.S.P.Q.
369 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
139. See Orlando, 426 F.Supp. 616; (E.D. Pa. 1977); Five Platters, 419 F.Supp. 372; In re
Carson, 197 U.S.P.Q. 554.
140. Since a service mark is designed to inform the public of the origin of the services and not
to protect the owner's ability to render those services, the service mark cannot be the service itself.
Thus, in In re Lee Travino, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board refused to grant service mark
protection because the asserted mark was only descriptive of the endorsements which Travino
gave. The mark did not inform the public of the origin of the services, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 254. See
also Cebu Ass'n of California, Inc. v. Santo Nino de Cebu U.S.A., Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 129, 137,
157 Cal. Rptr. 102, 107 (1979) (service mark must be distinctive, separate, and apart from identity
of service itself, so as to permit many others to offer the same service; one cannot appropriate
identity of service mark or else all others would be excluded from the field); KGB, Inc. v. Gian-
noulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 856-57, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571, 582-83 (1980) (to be entitled to service
mark protection, service mark must be stationary and unchanging; since former employee of radio
station had appeared in a chicken costume similar, though not identical, to radio station's chicken
costume and developed his own distinctive mannerisms while appearing in costume, a service
mark infringement did not occur).
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vertising, or selling the services generally warrants service mark recog-
nition and protection. 4' Although a court uses its powers to draw
reasonable inferences from all the facts to determine whether a service
mark is valid, it is critical that the plaintiff show how the service mark
was used in relation to the identification of services.142 A court will not
recognize a mark that is only tangentially related to the services ren-
dered without a showing that the mark actually identified the services
provided.
143
The extent of protection afforded in a service mark infringement ac-
tion initially depends on the classification of the mark itself' 44  One
classification of marks, those which either are descriptive or which use
common words or symbols, must acquire secondary meaning
45
through use before protection is afforded. 146 The other classification of
marks, inherently distinctive marks,147 gain protected status upon their
first use in commerce.148 It is unnecessary for a plaintiff who owns an
inherently distinctive mark to prove that his or her mark has acquired
secondary meaning. 149 Thus, in Caesars World,'5 ' the plaintiff's service
marks consisting of the phrase "Caesars Palace" written in a Roman-
esque letter style'-' were protectable as inherently distinctive marks be-




In some cases where the service mark infringement claim is used as
an alternative to the right of publicity, the secondary meaning require-
141. See, eg., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d 200, 205-06; Caesars World, 490
F.Supp. 818, 822; James Burrough, 540 F.2d 266, 274.
142. See Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 381,280 N.W.2d 129, 131 (1979)
(to establish a common law trade name infringement, plaintiff was required to show that his nick-
name designated his vocation or occupation as a sports figure and that the use of his name on a
shaving gel for women created a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship).
143. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir. 1979). Affording
protection to marks bearing only a tangential relation to a service would not advance the primary
goal which service marks are designed to achieve-ensuring that the consuming public is not
misled into believing that the services it associates with a particular mark are the services it wants.
144. See Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at 822.
145. The word "secondary" in "secondary meaning" does not refer to the relative importance
of a descriptive as opposed to an inherently distinctive mark. Instead, "secondary" refers to the
passage of time. Thus, material which originally may have had only descriptive significance now
with the passage of time has acquired a secondary meaning which informs the consuming public
what the origin of the services are. See VANDENBURGH, supra note 115, §4.70; G. & C. Merriam
Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912); see also GiLOsN, supra note 2, §2.09.
146. Caesars World, 490 F.Supp. at 822.
147. Inherently distinctive marks are also called technical marks. Id. Fanciful or arbitrary
words and symbols warrant the inherently distinctive mark classification. See Scott Paper Co. v.
Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1022, 1034 (D. Del. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 589 F.2d
1225 (3d Cir. 1978).
148. 490 F. Supp. at 822.
149. Id. at 823.
150. 490 F. Supp. at 818.
151. Id. at 823.
152. Id. In Caesars World, the court also noted that the plaintiffs service marks were in-
vented solely for use in connection with its resort hotel. Id. at 822.
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ment may be an obstacle to the assertion of a valid claim. A plaintiff
asserting a personal name as a service mark, such as the name Elvis
Presley, must show that because the marks have been used for such a
long period of time in connection with the advertising and promotion
of certain entertainment services, the mark has acquired a secondary
meaning which distinguishes those entertainment services from any
other entertainment service.1 53 This was the result reached in Scarves
by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd, " where the court recognized that
although the plaintiff s trademark "Vera" was a common personal
name,155 the plaintiff established secondary meaning in the eyes of the
consuming public by showing that its sales figures and advertising ex-
penses reflected a wide public acceptance of the mark "Vera."'
156
III. BRIDGING THE GAP: ESTATE OF PRESLEY v RUSSEN
In evaluating the estate's causes of action, the Estate of Presley court
first turned to the right of publicity issue. The court concluded that the
estate established a likelihood of success on the merits for the right of
publicity claim because New Jersey has recognized and supported an
individual's right to prevent the unauthorized, commercial appropria-
tion of one's name and likeness'57 and because the right of publicity, as
it is known today, protects against theatrical imitations.' 58  Neverthe-
less, the court denied the preliminary injunction based on the right of
publicity claim because the estate failed to establish an irreparable in-
jury.'59 Concluding that the right of publicity is designed to protect an
individual's exclusive right to reap the commercial benefits of his or her
persona, the court asserted that the estate must establish that Russen's
activity somehow impeded the estate's ability to capitalize on Presley's
persona.' 60 Moreover, since in a right of publicity claim the court is
often asked to balance the societal considerations of free expression
against the individual's right to capitalize on his or her persona, the
153. See Five Platters, 419 F. Supp. at 381.
154. 544 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976) ("VERA" for scarves enforced against "VERA" for toilet-
ries); see also Jerrico, Inc. v. Jerry's Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
155. 544 F.2d at 1173.
156. Id.
157. 513 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
158. Id. at 1355-56. Accord Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F.Supp.
485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). Critical to the court's
determination that the estate's right of publicity protected against Russen's imitation of a Presley
performance was the conclusion that Russen's activity was commercial in nature rather than being
newsworthy, informative, or contributing to the public debate of political or social issues. Had
Russen's production stemmed from the latter, it is likely that he would have been immune from
liability because this activity would have been protected under the first amendment.
159. 513 F. Supp. at 1379.
160. Id. at 1378.
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need for showing a bona fide injury is heightened.' 6' Thus, since the
estate failed to establish irreparable injury here, it was necessary for the
court to explore the estate's alternative causes of action.
The critical alternative cause of action which the estate asserted was
the service mark infringement claim.' 62 As explained in Part II above,
a plaintiff asserting the service mark claim must establish that he
owned the marks, that the marks were valid and protectable, and that
the defendant's use of a similar mark was likely to confuse members of
the consuming public as to the source of the defendant's products.'
63
A. Ownership of Service Marks
In Estate of Presley, after a detailed, methodical analysis of the es-
tate's common law service mark infringement claim, 164 the court con-
cluded that the estate possessed valid service marks in Elvis Presley's
persona;165 in the names of Elvis, Elvis Presley, and Elvis in Concert;1
66
161. Id. at 1378-79.
162. Id. at 1361-72.
163. The estate was also successful in alleging violations of both the New Jersey common law
of unfair competition, and section 43(a) of the Laniham Act. The court concluded that under New
Jersey common law service mark infringement claims are but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition; consequently, there are more restrictions on service mark claims than on unfair com-
petition claims. Thus, since the estate had proven a likelihood of success on the merits regarding
its service mark infringement claim, it had also proven a likelihood of success on the merits con-
cerning its common law unfair competition claim. As part of its common law unfair competition
claim, the estate also alleged that the "Big El Show" itself, and not merely the infringement on the
service marks in question, constituted unfair competition because the audience viewing the per-
formance is necessarily deceived into believing it is dealing with a service of the estate of Elvis
Presley. The court was unconvinced that the doctrine of unfair competition was designed to pro-
hibit the performance of an individual imitating a famous performer like Presley, particularly
since the original performer was no longer living. The court held that the unfair competition
doctrine, just as the service mark infringement doctrine, could be invoked only to prohibit the use
of the estate's marks in the promotion and advertising of Russen's production.
Similarly, with respect to the section 43(a) claim, the court held that although section 43(a) may
proscribe competitive torts not covered by trademark infringement law or common law unfair
competition, as a general rule, the same facts which would support an action for service mark
infringement or common law unfair competition would also support an action for unfair competi-
tive practices under section 43(a). Therefore, since the estate had proven a likelihood of success
on the merits with respect to the common law service mark infringement claim, it also established
a violation of section 43(a). The court correctly observed that section 43(a) created a distinct
federal statutory tort not limited solely to trademark or service mark infringement claims. Section
43(a) was designed to afford broad protection against various forms of unfair competition and
false advertising. It remains to be seen whether section 43(a) will have utility as an alternative to
the right of publicity in those cases where even a common law service mark cannot be established.
See GILSON, supra note 2, §7.02; Note, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Its Development and
Potential, 3 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 327 (1972). The court offered suggestions as to how Russen could
conduct his activity without violating section 43(a). These suggestions stressed the importance of
Russen making clear on the face of the advertising that his production was not affiliated with,
sponsored by, or in any way connected with the same people who provided actual Elvis Presley
entertainment services. This would facilitate achieving the laudable goals of section 43(a)-
preventing and alleviating deceptive and misleading advertising and stressing the need for provid-
ing the public with truthful information about the services and their sources or sponsorship.
164. 513 F. Supp. at 1361-72.
165. Id. at 1363-64. The estate maintained that any likeness or image of Elvis Presley serves
as a service mark; however, the court was unwilling to accept such a broad position. The court
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and in the TCB logo.1 67 The court was, however, cautious in conclud-
ing that the estate owned the service marks. This conclusion came only
after a lengthy discussion regarding the contractual arrangement be-
tween the estate, the Boxcar Corp. (Presley's publicity corporation),
and Boxcar's licensee, Factors. 168 The court recognized that the agree-
ments, the estate-Boxcar arrangement and the Boxcar-Factors contract,
were terminable. 69 Upon termination, the existing rights to the Presley
name, likeness, image, and service marks reverted to the estate.' 70
B. Validity and Protectability of Service Marks
The court concluded that with the exception of one of the asserted
service marks, "The King", 17 1 the estate established that the names
Elvis, Elvis Presley, and Elvis in Concert; 171 the TCB logo; 173 and the
likeness and image of Presley embodied in the "Elvis Pose" were valid
service marks.' 74 Each had appeared in connection with the advertis-
ing of concerts or performances, 75 the conduct of day-to-day business
affairs, 17 6 or the production of goods (i.e. records).
177
For a person's name to achieve valid service mark protection, it gen-
erally must acquire secondary meaning and be identified with the serv-
ices offered.' 78 The Estate of Presley court concluded that, indeed, the
names Elvis, Elvis Presley, and Elvis in Concert, 179 as well as the "Elvis
Pose", had acquired a secondary meaning. 80 Thus, these words were
afforded traditional service mark protection. The court also concluded
that the TCB logo warranted service mark protection since the mark
did, however, conclude that an illustration of Elvis Presley dressed in one of his typical jumpsuits
and holding a microphone in a singing pose was likely to be construed as a service mark. The
court referred to this service mark as the "Elvis Pose" and concluded that, indeed, it had been
used in connection with the promotion and advertising of Elvis Presley entertainment services to
identify those services. Id.
166. Id. at 1363.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1345-58.
169. Id. at 1347.
170. Id. at 1348.
171. Id. at 1363. Although the court recognized that Elvis Presley's nickname was "The
King", the estate failed to present sufficient evidence showing that "The King" identified the serv-
ices provided by Presley. If the estate had demonstrated that the phrase "The King" was not only
Presley's nickname, but was also used in connection with radio or television promotions for con-
certs, tours, records, etc., then the court would have found the requisite nexus between the name
and the identification of services.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1364.
175. Id. at 1363 (names).
176. Id. (the TCB logo appearing on Presley letterheads and business cards).
177. Id. at 1363-64 (both the names and the "Elvis Pose" used to advertise and sell record
albums).
178. See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
179. 513 F. Supp. at 1364.
180. Id. at 1365.
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could be characterized as inherently distinctive.'
C Likelihood of Confusion
After evaluating the necessary elements in a likelihood of confusion
determination, the Estate of Presley court concluded that the estate had
made a strong showing of likelihood of confusion.' 82 The court found
that the estate's service marks were very strong, had acquired a great
distinctiveness in the eyes of the consuming public, and strongly identi-
fied the entertainment services provided by Elvis Presley or his es-
tate.18 3 The court also found that both the estate's marks and Russen's
marks were extremely similar."s Although the court determined that
all of the defendant's marks were confusingly similar to those owned by
the estate, it took particular notice of the similarity between actual
Elvis Presley photographs and "Big El Show" promotional informa-
tion.8 5 The conclusion that the marks were extremely similar mitigated
against the defendent's claim that there was no likelihood of confusion.
The evaluation of the "similarity of services" and the "similarity of
channels of trade" factors was a bit more difficult for the court. Al-
though both Russen and the estate were involved in the offering of en-
tertainment services, 8 6 Russen claimed that since most people
recognized that Elvis Presley died, this fact alone eliminated the con-
clusion that members of the consuming public were likely to be con-
fused.187 Russen asserted that this was particularly true with respect to
a showing of similarity of services or similarity of channels of trade."8
The Court recognized, however, that although Russen primarily of-
fered live entertainment services in the form of a stage show 8 9 and the
estate primarily offered entertainment services in the form of video or
audio recordings, 90 the fact that the defendant could make a film of
the "Big El Show" strongly suggested that both the services and chan-
nels of trade were extremely similar.' 91 The court also recognized that
since members of the consuming public might be led to believe that the
"Big El Show" was authorized or sponsored by the estate, a showing of
similarity of services and trade was established. 92
181. Id. at 1364; see also supra note 147-152 and accompanying text.
182. 513 F. Supp. at 1372.
183.. Id. at 1367.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1368-69.
187. Id. at 1371.
188. Id. at 1369-70.
189. Id. at 1369.
190. Id. at 1368.
191. Id. at 1369 n.34.
192. Id. at 1371.
1983 / Right Of Publicity
These four factors combined-the strength of the estate's marks, the
similarity of the marks, the similarity of services, and the similarity of
channels of trade--enabled the estate to establish with sufficient cer-
tainty a likelihood of confusion.
1 93
IV. CONCLUSION
By virtue of the amount of money involved in the entertainment and
professional athletic industries, along with a public eager to praise its
celebrities, an environment conducive to commercial parasites misap-
propriating a celebrity's property rights is created. While a right of
publicity claim may provide solace for some injured plaintiffs, often the
right is inadequate to protect the full commercial interests of either the
celebrity or the estate. In those jurisdictions placing some limitation on
the right of publicity or in situations when the plaintiff fails to satisfy
the requirements for a preliminary injunction to issue, Estate ofPresley
v. Russen represents a viable alternative which will provide relief in the
wake of a traditional right of publicity claim. Estate of Presley ad-
vances the fundamental values of protecting the plaintiffs goodwill,
providing for an informed consuming public, and compelling the de-
fendant to create a quality production without resorting to deceiving
the public or piggybacking on the plaintiffs goodwill.
The service mark infringement claim should be asserted with cau-
tion, both because not all courts may be as receptive to this alternative
as the Estate oftPresley court and because the plaintiff still must show a
valid service mark identifying the services offered as well as a likeli-
hood of success on the merits. There remains little doubt, however,
that the viability of Estate ofPresley will be tested shortly, concomitant
with the -expansion of the right of publicity.
193. Id. at 1372.
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